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Introduction
The principal-agent problem can arise when voters and their elected representative have different objectives or preferences. The problem is often stated with reference to politicians catering to special interests (see Barro 1973 and for an overview of the literature Hillman 2009, chapter 2). Evidence on the principal-agent problem includes regulation, protectionist policies and staff growth in international organizations (Peltzman 1976; Hillman 1982; Grossman and Helpman 1994; Vaubel 2006; Vaubel et al. 2007) . It is possible for voters to successfully respond to the principal-agent problem: a documented case is voting on the EU I consider the principal-agent problem in the context of public spending on cultural facilities. Evidence on the nexus between political ideology and spending on culture is not clear-cut (Schulze and Rose 1998; Getzner 2002; Werck et al. 2008; Dalle Nogare and Galizzi 2011; Potrafke 2011a Potrafke , 2011b De Witte and Geys 2011; Benito et al. 2013; Noonan 2007; Lewis and Rushton 2007) . 2 Rightwing voters might however be expected to support public spending on traditional cultural events such as concerts, theatres, operas and art exhibitions more so than leftwing voters (see Schulze and Ursprung 2000) . Leftwing voters, if they have low incomes, may be able to afford highbrow cultural events only when the government subsidizes the arts. In the United States, for example, voters aligned with the Democrats have 2 Rightwing governments spent more on universities than leftwing governments in the German states (Oberndorfer and Steiner 2007; Potrafke 2011a ). Schulze's (2008) results suggest that conservative politicians spent more on research in relative terms . The reason may well be that the clientele of leftist parties profit relatively little from public spending on higher education. In Switzerland, social democratic ideology has had a negative influence on privatizing education (Merzyn and Ursprung 2005) . been shown to support subsidizing cultural institutions more strongly than declared Republicans (Brooks 2001 (Brooks , 2004 Rushton 2005; Lewis and Rushton 2007) . Leftwing voters with high incomes might vote to support public finance for cultural events on the grounds of bringing culture to the lower-income population.
I examine whether voter preferences correspond with the preferences of their political representatives. I use data on voting by political representatives and on direct voting in referenda with regard to public spending on construction or extension of concert halls in two German cities. 3 Referenda are uncommon in Germany. Empirical studies show that public spending and debt decrease when voters can influence public spending vis-à-vis their representatives. That is, voters´ preferences are better transmitted by direct than representative democracy (e.g., Feld et al. 2008 Feld et al. , 2010a Feld et al. , 2010b Feld and Kirchgässner 2001; Feld et al. 2011; Matsusaka 2005) . Voters' preferences expressed in the referenda were contrary to decisions taken by political representatives. The evidence suggests that the principal-agent problems were due to political representatives being more bourgeois than their constituencies.
Principal-agent problems are usually predicated on asymmetric information that permits political representatives to take decisions counter to voters' interests. In the cases studied in this paper, representatives made a decision to fund the concert halls, and subsequent referenda overturned those decisions. The issues were sufficiently salient to evoke voter resistance.
Empirical analysis

Data and variables
The data for this study is on the voting outcome of the referenda on the construction of the concert hall in Konstanz on March 21, 2010 and on the extension of the concert/congress hall 3 Getzner (2004) and Rushton (2005) investigate the influence of political ideology on cultural policy referenda in Austria and the United States.
in Heidelberg on July 25, 2010. The referenda were independent of one another. Konstanz and Heidelberg are midsize cities in the south west of Germany. The dataset for the referendum in Konstanz contains 65 observations for all electoral districts. Voters were asked whether they agree to the building of a concert hall in the area "Klein-Venedig", which is located directly at the shore of Lake Konstanz. The cost of construction volume was approximately 48 million Euros, about 25% of the city´s annual budget.
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The dataset for the referendum in Heidelberg contains 59 observations for all electoral districts (the appendix provides a list of the electoral districts and boroughs in both cities). Voters were asked whether they agree on extending the existing concert/congress hall located in the city center of Heidelberg (Altstadt). The construction cost was approximately 26 million Euros, about 5% of the city´s annual budget. I use ballot box votes. Voters are required to cast their ballots in the electoral district in which they live.
In both cities, a significant majority voted against the construction/extension of the concert halls: in Konstanz, 20.800 voters (65.7%) voted against and 10.875 voters (34.2%) voted for the construction of the concert hall.
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The voting turnout was 52.2%. The referendum is effectual (quorum 25%). The concert hall will not be built. In Heidelberg, 26.324 voters (67.1%) voted against and 12.911 voters (32.9%) voted for the extension of the concert/congress hall.
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The voting turnout was 38.9%. The referendum is effectual (quorum 25%). The concert/congress hall would not be extended. Figure 1 and 2 show the share of "No´s" of actual votes in the individual boroughs in Konstanz and Heidelberg.
The clear-cut result is surprising for two reasons: (1) the mayors initiated the projects and (2) voters in both cities traditionally esteem cultural activities. The opinion poll by Findeisen and Hinz (2011) and local newspaper articles document why voters did not support 4 On private demand for public subsidies to the arts see, e.g., Pommerehne and Schneider (1983) . 5 This includes 6.714 postal voters. Voting behavior between postal and ballot box voters was very similar: 62.7% of the postal voters and 66.5% of the ballot box voters voted against the proposal. 6 This includes 8.528 postal voters. Voting behavior between postal and ballot box voters was very similar: 68.2% of the postal voters and 66.6% of the ballot box voters voted against the proposal. the construction/extension of the concert halls. I investigated all articles and letters to the editors on the referenda published 2009 and 2010 in the "Südkurier" (Konstanz) and the "Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung" (Heidelberg) . 7 An important reason for the vote against the construction of the concert hall in Konstanz was the location. Many voters would likely have voted in favor of a concert hall in Konstanz but disagreed with the location directly at the shore of the Lake Konstanz. Voters in Heidelberg did not agree with the cost and the location.
Opponents of the extension of the concert/congress hall in the city center argued that too many trees would need to be cut down. Many conservative and liberal voters were also concerned about monument protection.
7 I am grateful to Angelika Speck from the "Südkurier" and Rainer Wesch from the "Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung" collecting all the articles. I investigated 150 articles and 91 letters to the editors published in the "Südkurier" and 78 articles and 68 letters to the editors published in the "Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung". 16% of the articles and letters to the editors in the "Südkurier" and 12% in the "Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung" explicitly show that the location and financial volume have influenced the voting behavior to a great deal. Both cities have universities and students mostly vote for the Greens. Konstanz was the first city in Germany whose mayor belongs to the Green party. By contrast, the dominant political party in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg has been the conservative CDU. At the local level, the so called "Free voters" also campaign. The Free Voters have political platforms in the middle of the political spectrum.
The electorate for referenda corresponds with the electorate for local elections. In contrast to German federal and state elections, permanent residents are also allowed to participate in referenda and local elections. In Heidelberg, resistance to the extension of the concert/congress hall was not pronounced in electoral districts in which citizens vote for the SPD: the correlation coefficient between the share of the SPD and No´s on the referendum is negative (r=-0.19). Just as in Konstanz, resistance to the extension of the concert/congress hall was pronounced in electoral 9 I use this distinction because scholars have tested for ideology-induced effects on German economic policymaking by employing left-right dummy variables (e.g, Seitz 2000; Schneider 2010; Potrafke 2012 ). The reason is that all federal chancellors and state prime ministers have been members of one of these two major blocks, SPD and CDU (CSU in Bavaria) until 2011. German parties can be grouped in a leftwing camp (SPD, Green, Linke) and a rightwing camp (CDU/CSU and FDP). districts in which citizens vote for the socialist Linke (r= 0.54), whereas resistance was much less pronounced in electoral districts in which citizens vote for the CDU (r= -0.75), for the FDP (r= -0.27), and for the "Free Voters" (r= -0.50). While advocates of the Greens were divided on the concert hall referendum in Konstanz, the Greens (Grüne and GAL) strongly opposed the extension of the concert/congress hall in Heidelberg. The correlation coefficient between the share of the Greens and No´s on the referendum is 0.68. I have also investigated the correlation between the share of No´s on the referendum and the share of "Heidelberg pflegen und erhalten" (r = 0.56), "Generation Heidelberg" (r=0.75) and the "Heidelberger" 
The econometric model
The baseline econometric model has the following form:
with i= 1,…, 65 (1,…,59); k = 1,…,6 ; l=1…,4 (1,…5,)
where the dependent variable Referendum Vote Share ( (1) and (3) political ideology is measured by the individual party vote shares, in column (2) and (4) political ideology is measured by the vote shares for leftwing and rightwing parties.
Basic regression results
The control variables in column (3) do not turn out to be statistically significant. In column (4), voting turnout is statistically significant at the 1% level and indicates that the shares of "No´s" decreases by about 0.25 percentage points, when voting turnout increased by one percentage point.
12
By contrast, the political party variables in columns (1) and (3) Table 3 shows the regression results for Heidelberg. The neighbor district dummy variable is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (3) and (4) and indicates that the share of "No´s" was about five percentage points higher in the electoral districts in the city center than in the other boroughs. Resistance to the extension of the concert/congress hall was thus pronounced in the electoral districts surrounding the concert/congress hall.
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The unemployment rate is statistically significant at the 1% level in column (4) and has the expected positive sign: the coefficient indicates that the share of "No´s" was about 1.8
percentage points higher when the unemployment rate increases by one percentage point. This finding implies that unemployed persons do not prefer to have tax money spent on cultural affairs. The other control variables do not turn out to be statistically significant.
The political party variables in columns (1) and (3) the CDU variable has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in column (1) and at the 5% level in column (3). The numerical meaning of the coefficients is that a corresponding increase of the voting share for the CDU by one percentage point would decrease the No´s share in the referendum by about 0.57 percentage points. The coefficient of the FDP variable has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) and (3). The numerical meaning of the coefficients is that a corresponding increase of the voting share for the FDP by one percentage point would decrease the No´s 13 Concert halls are expected to have negative and positive externalities on the neighborhood. In fact, it is likely that the value of properties in the neighborhood increases when a brand-new concert hall is built (positive externality -in Konstanz) . This positive externality is likely to be smaller when an existing concert hall is extended (Heidelberg) . In Heidelberg, the negative externalities appear to over compensate the small positive externalities. Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robustness Checks
I checked the robustness of the results in several ways. Voting behavior in an individual election district is likely to be influenced by voting behavior in neighboring electoral districts (e.g., Revelli 2008) . Figure 1 and 2 show a spatial pattern in the voting behavior on the construction/extension of the concert halls. I have therefore included a spatially lagged dependent variable that considers geographical neighbors.
14 The spatial weight matrix is rownormalized. I have estimated a spatial lag model using instrumental variables and have regressed the spatially weighted dependent variable on the explanatory and spatially weighted explanatory variables in the first stage. Table 4 shows the results for Konstanz: the coefficients of the spatially lagged dependent variables have a positive sign and are statistically significant at the 10% level in columns (1) and (3), at the 5% level in column (2) and at the 1% level in column (4). The numerical meaning of the coefficients is that a corresponding increase of the No´s share in the referendum in the average neighboring electoral district by one percentage point would increase the No´s share in the referendum by about 0.7 percentage points. Including the spatially lagged dependent variable does not change the inferences regarding the ideology variables at all. Table 5 shows the results for Heidelberg: the spatially lagged dependent variables do not turn out to be statistically significant. Including the spatially lagged dependent variable does not change the inferences regarding the ideology variables at all. Further control variables are likely to influence preferences on cultural policy. The reason for the lack of control variables is the small size of the electoral districts. To approximate differences in income I replaced the retail buying power variable by a high income borough dummy variable which assumes the value one for boroughs with many onefamily houses and mansions and zero otherwise.
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The high income borough dummy variable does not turn out to be statistically significant when the individual party share variables are used; it is statistically significant with the expected negative sign when the left/right political variables are used. Including the high income borough variable does not change the inferences regarding the political variables (results not shown).
Religion may also influence preferences on cultural policy (e.g. Katz-Gerro et al. Konstanz 2010a Konstanz , 2010b . In January 2010, the city council decided to initiate a referendum on the construction of the concert hall for two reasons. First, the decision has been regarded to be so important and the financial volume to be so huge that the voters should have a say in it.
Second, a referendum could have been initiated by the citizens anyhow by collecting more than 5.000 signatures.
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The city council wanted to prevent the citizens from calling a referendum and initiated it itself. The referendum did not result in a majority for the proposal because many conservative and liberal voters did not agree with the location of the concert hall.
The city council in Heidelberg has 41 seats. When the city council voted on the extension of the concert/congress hall in March 2010, the seating was as follows: 9 CDU, 10
Greens (6 Grüne and 4 GAL), 7 SPD, 4 FDP, 3 "Heidelberger", 2 Free Voters, 2 "Generation 16 Citizens can petition referenda. The number of signatures required depends on the number of inhabitants in the cities/communities. http://www.landesrechtbw.de/jportal/;jsessionid=F82A3192CD9F70AA4E8E2114612EB12D.jpb4?quelle=jlink&query=GemO+BW&p sml=bsbawueprod.psml&max=true&aiz=true#jlr-GemOBWV11P21%20jlr-GemOBWV8P21%20jlr-GemOBWV9P21%20jlr-GemOBWV10P21 (accessed 24.06.2013). 
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I have collected data on education of the city council members in Konstanz and Heidelberg: 65% of the 17 In 2011, two council members of the GAL joined the "Grüne" faction. The remaining two council members of the GAL form a working group with the council member from "Heidelberg pflegen und erhalten". The eight council members from the "Grüne" form a faction with the two council members from "Generation Heidelberg". 18 Scholars investigate types of referenda (required/non-required; active/passive etc). See, for example, Tridimas (2007 Tridimas ( , 2010 , Hug (2004) , Hug and Sciarini (2000) . My findings relate to studies that examine the nexus between voter preferences and political representation with US, Swedish and Swiss data (e.g., Levitt 1996; Gerber and Lewis 2004; Brunner et al. 2013; Ågren et al. 2006; Eichenberger et al. 2012; Portmann et al. 2012; Stadelmann et al. 2012; Portmann and Stadelmann 2013) . To be sure, in contrast to the studies using US and Swiss data, council members in Konstanz and Heidelberg are not directly elected in the electoral districts, because the electoral districts are too small. The political parties provide candidate lists. The number of seats an individual party receives depends on the number of votes in all electoral districts (proportional representation). I therefore cannot draw any conclusions on how voter preferences in an individual electoral district influence decisions of the electoral districts deputy.
Conclusion
I have presented evidence on a political principal-agent problem regarding public spending and also environmental considerations associated with location. Resistance to public funding for the concert halls was particularly strong in electoral districts with large constituencies on the left. The direct-democratic vote against the concert halls is contrary to voting behavior of leftwing local representatives.
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As in general in parliamentary democracies, voter preferences are usually transmitted in Germany by political representation, not by direct-democratic routes. My findings show that, even at the regional or local level where preferences of politicians and voters might be expected to be closely aligned because of proximity of voters to their representatives, the voting behavior of politicians can be decoupled from the preferences of their constituencies. I propose that the decoupling occurs because political representatives are more bourgeois than their constituencies. In the cases studied in this paper, the presence of a political-agent problem due to differences in politicians' and voters' preferences did not result in the usual ability of politicians to have their way because of 21 Peltzman (1992) shows that the US government has grown faster than voters wish. asymmetric information. The issues were sufficiently salient for voters to resist and to prevail.
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